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ABSTRACT
The paper describes and analyzes the post-war grcwth patterns of the 
13 major Western European welfare states based on time-series 
data on social security expenditure in the period 1949-1977.
Part I describes the common trends and elaborates the major 
divergences of West European welfare state developments. Despite 
a common increase of social expenditure ratios in the post-war 
period and common patterns of accelerated growth since the 
second half of the 1960s, there is no trend towards convergence. 
Levels and growth rates of social expenditure differ widely, 
and institutional set ups of the welfare state show marked 
variation. Both phenomena, common trends and national variations 
are pointed out as objects for scholarly explanation.
Part II examines some causes of welfare state expansion. Three 
major theories on the causes of growth are confronted with empiri­
cal data: Marxist theories are tested by comparisons of social 
expenditure ratios in capitalist Western European and non­
capitalist Eastern European countries. Social control theories 
are examined by an analysis of the relationship between social 
expenditure growth and changes in family instability. Political 
explanations are confronted with data on growth patterns under 
various governments.
Part III analyzes some economic consequences of welfare state 
expansion. Three groups of countries with different patterns of 
welfare state development in the 1970s are compared with respect 
to their record of economic growth, inflation, and public debt. 
Contrary to fashionable theories on the limits of the welfare 
state, countries with low levels and modest growth of social 
expenditures appear to be more severely troubled by economic 
problems than countries with higher levels and marked growth of 
social spending.
The concluding part IV discusses the theoretical significance of 






















































































































































































SOME CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1949 - 1977 +)
I Common trends and national paths of welfare state development
The welfare state has recently become the subject of much scholarly 
and political debate. In the attempt to better understand the causes 
and functions of its secular growth, socio­
logists and political scientists have devoted considerable space 
to a clarification of the concept "welfare state" by elaborating 
its historical core and changing boundaries. In all these debates
there is little doubt that the social security schemes whose
2origins may be traced to the late nineteenth century still 
constitute the institutional backbone of present social policies. 
Since 1949 the International Labour Office has gone far in the 
attempt to present internationally comparable figures on the 
expenditure and the financing of these schemes. According to 
the definition of the I.L.O. social expenditures consist of the 
outlays for the following six programmes: social insurance (i.e. 
the schemes which try to protect the population against the standard 
risks of economic insecurity: old age or death of the family 
breadwinner, invalidity, sickness, occupational injuries, and 
unemployment); public health; public assistance; family allowances; 
benefits for civil servants; and benefits for war victims.
As table 1 shows expenditure for these purposes averaged some 9 % 
of GDP in Western Europe in 1949.^ Only Austria, Belgium, France, 
and Germany had already surpassed the threshold of 10 %, while 
the United Kingdom was close to it. All other nations had social 
expenditure ratios clearly below 1 0 %, with a minimum value in 
Norway of 5.5 %. In the 1950s all countries increased their shares 
of social spending in GDP, but the growth of the ratio remained 
modest. On average the social expenditure ratio rose by 2.1
This research is based on a data collection which the author 
compiled for the forthcoming data handbook of the HIWED-project 
(Historical Indicators of the Western European Democracies). The 
project was directed by Peter Flora and financed by the Stiftung 
Volkswagenwerk. The data handbook will be published this year by 
Campus in Frankfurt under the title:"State, Economy, and Society 
in Western Europe, 1815-1975". The author gratefully acknowledges 
the many stimulating theoretical discussions with the project 
director, and the kind comments offered by his colleagues at the 
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percentage points, pushing the mean Western European 
ratio above 11 % by 1960. In the 1960s the speed of growth 
doubled, with a marked acceleration in the second half of the 
decade. On average the social expenditure ratio rose by 4.4 
percentage points in the 196 0s. By 19 70 social outlays averaged 
15.8 % of GDP. The maximum value - 2o % in the Netherlands - was 
twice as high as the minimum level reached in Switzerland (1o %).
Notwithstanding the marked growth of the 196os social spending
continued to increase its share in GDP by another 6 . 6 percentage
points in the 1970s. As table 2 shows the pace of growth of the
social expenditure ratio has in fact been increasing consistently
throughout all five quinquennial periods since 1950. Departing
from the modest increase of .9 percentage points in the first
half of the 1950s it accelerated to an impressive peak of 5.4
4percentage points in the first half of the 1970s.














(1 .2 ) 1970-77 6 . 6
By 1977 the average Western European social expenditure ratio had 
reached 22.4 % of GDP. Sweden was the biggest social spender with 
an expenditure ratio of 30.5 %. Switzerland spent least with a ratio 
of 16.1 %. Only three other nations - Finland (19.3 %), Ireland 
(18.3 %), and the United Kingdom (17.3 %) remained below the level 
of 20 per cent (cf table 1 ).
Throughout the post-war period phase-specific variations in the 
pace of annual increases of the expenditure ratio are very similarly 
distributed over the 13 countries (see table 3). On average the 
GDP share of social spending increased by half a percentage point 
every year. Five phases stand out as periods of accelerated growth 
in several countries: the years 1952-53 (average increases of 
.6 8 and .42 percentage points); 1957-58 with consecutive increments 
of .52 and .6 8 percentage points; 1966-68 with increases of .77,
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The generality of these phases of accelerated growth is striking.
In 1952-53 9 of the 13 countries witnessed above average increases 
of .7 percentage points or more. In 1957-58 only France, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom deviated from the general pattern of accelerated 
growth. In the second half of the 1960s the expenditure ratio rose 
overproportionately in all countries without exception. In 1971-72 
only Austria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom abstained from 
heavy increases, whereas the upsurge of the expenditure ratio 
around 1975 was again a general phenomenon shared by all countries.
After 1975 the pace of growth began to slow down again. Several 
nations saw either stagnation (Austria, Switzerland) or even 
decreases of the GDP share of social outlays in 1976/77 (Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom). Whether this denotes 
a turn of the secular trend towards welfare state expansion remains 
to be seen. In the past, similar phases of stagnation (1954-55,
1959-60, 1969-70) were only temporary and did not halt the long­
term trend towards expansion.
The post-war period was thus characterized by a general pattern 
of social expenditure growth throughout the Western European 
democracies. Not only did social spending consistently increase 
its share in GDP, but the pace of this increase also accelerated 
over time. These common tendencies are» however, accompanied by 
some important national variations. In fact the Western European 
welfare states have not become more similar during the phase of 
general expansion. If we take the standard deviation of the social 
expenditure ratio as indicator, there is no trend towards convergence 
but towards increasing heterogeneity instead (see table 1). Up to 
1964 the standard deviation of the expenditure ratio remained 
practically constant, fluctuating around 2.5 percentage points.
In the second half of the 1960s the degree of heterogeneity also 
remained fairly constant, albeit on a slightly higher level (with 
the standard deviation fluctuating around 2.9). The 1970s then 
witnessed an almost consistent trend towards increasing diversity.
For the first time the standard deviation surpassed the level of 
3 percentage points, to reach even 4.1 points in 1977. As figure 1 
(page15) shows the margin between the biggest and the lowest spending 
country also widened continuously.
percentage points, and the period 1974-76 in which the expenditure




























































































The increasing heterogeneity of social expenditure levels was 
accompanied by distinct national patterns of welfare state 
development which significantly changed the rank order of high 
and low spending countries over time (see table 4). Only the 1950s 
were a period of outspoken stability in which all countries practically 
maintained their relative positions. Throughout the decade neither 
the four leading social spenders with expenditure ratios above 
10 % from the outset (Germany, Belgium, Austria, and France) nor 
the three laggards (Finland, Switzerland, and Norway) were re - 
placed by other nations. The rank order correlation between the 
positions held in 1950 and 1960 is correspondingly high (.90).
The 1960s saw much greater dynamics of change. With heavy increases 
of their social expenditure ratios the Netherlands and Sweden moved 
into top positions, whereas Norway climbed up by three ranks.
Germany, France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, increased 
their ratios only modestly and consequently moved down in the 
rank order of Western European nations. In 1970, Germany, the 
long standing pioneer of social policies in Europe, found itself 
in the fifth position, whereas the United Kingdom had dropped from 
the fifth place occupied in 1950 to the tenth position. In the 
1970s Sweden and France dynamically expanded the welfare state 
whereas Austria, the other European pioneer of social policies beside 
Germany, was much more restrictive and fell behind most other 
nations. In 1977 the rank occupied by each country bore little 
resemblance to its relative position in 1950 (rg= .35).
Table 4: Rank-order of social expenditure ratios in 1950,1960,1970 and 1977
AU BE DE FI FR GE JR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
1950 3 2 7 11 4 1 9 6 10 13 8 12 5
1960 3 1 6.5 12 4 2 10 5 6.5 11 in•00 13 8.5
1970 3 4 6 11 9 5 12 7 1 8 2 13 10
1977 8 4 5 10 3 6 12 7 2 9 1 13 11
Over the entire post-war period Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Italy, and Norway (in this order) registered the highest increases 
of the social expenditure ratio. Sweden as the most dynamic country 
augmented its GDP share of social spending by more than 22 percentage 
points. The Netherlands were following close behind with an increase 
of 20.5 percentage points. The other three dynamic countries just 
mentioned each had increases above 14 percentage points. In contrast, 




























































































their ratios by less than 10 percentage points. This differential 
pattern of growth is partly a function of the initial levels reached 
in 1950. With the exception of Ireland, all nations with sluggish 
growth had already reached above average expenditure levels in 1950.
On the other hand, all of the more dynamic countries had ranked 
among the half of welfare state laggards at that time (Italy and 
Denmark were in the middle positions 6 and 7). Despite this pattern 
the post-war process of welfare state expansion is not adequately 
described as a catch-up phenomenon in which previous laggards 
closed up on the pioneers. Rather, it is a process of interchange, 
whereby former laggards have moved into top positions (Sweden, 
Netherlands) while traditional leaders have fallen behind (Austria, 
Germany).
Following the phase of heavy growth in the 19 70s the Western European 
welfare states may be classified into three groups with markedly 
different profiles of social expenditure: At one extreme we have 
nations with high levels of social expenditure and extended growth in 
the 1970s (Sweden, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Denmark); in an 
intermediate position we find countries with medium levels of 
social spending and only moderate recent growth (Austria, Germany, 
Italy); at the other extreme, finally, there are nations with low 
levels of social outlays and low or modest growth in the recent 
period of greatest welfare state expansion (United Kingdom, Norway, 
Finland, Ireland, Switzerland). The following cross-tabulation shows 
this classification systematically.
Table 5: National profiles of social security expenditure development in the 1970s




Lew (<20) Medium (20-23) High (24+)
Low (< 5) UK, NO AD
Medium (5-7) FI, IR, SZ GE, IT
High (7+) SW, NE, FR, 
BE, DE
Besides the different paths of social expenditure development, there 
are some other important dimensions of variation among the Western 
European welfare states. Thus the functional distribution of expend­
itures may vary, the systems of financing show considerable 
heterogeneity, and there are important differences with respect to 




























































































Table 6 shows the distribution of benefit expenditures among 
the various schemes in 1977. The lion's share of social outlays 
is usually devoured by the pension systems which on average spend 
37 % of total benefit expenditure. In the single countries the 
share of the pension system varies between 25 % (Belgium, Ireland) 
and 52 % (Switzerland) . 5 In all nations except Belgium, Ireland, 
and Sweden the pension system thus is the biggest social spender, 
with the health system usually ranking second. On average about 
30 % of all social security expenditures are spent for health 
purposes (i.e. sickness insurance and public health). The percentage 
share of health expenditure is highest in Sweden (42 %), Ireland 
(41 %) and Norway (39 %), lowest in Austria (17.5 %). In the other 
countries it varies closely around the European mean of 30 %.
Together the pension and the health systems spend two thirds of 
all social security expenditures.
Table 6 ; Distribution of social security expenditures among
various schemes in 1977 (benefit expenditure in % of total benefits)
Country P en sions H ealth Fam ily 
A llow  '
C i v i l
S e rv a n ts
Unemploy­
ment
O ccu p ational 
I n ju r .  I n s .
S o c ia l
A ss is ta n c e
Other
AU 4 1 .9 1 7 .5 9 .5 2 0 .3 2 .6 2 .3 3 .0 2 .9
3E 2 5 .2 2 9 .2 1 2 .1 1 2 .3 1 0 .9 3 .3 4 .6 1 .9
DE 2 7 .1 2 6 .9 4 .1 3 .8 1 3 .6 0 .7 2 3 .6 0 .2
FI 3 3 .9 2 7 .9 4 .4 1 4 .3 3 .4 1 .4 1 1 .7 2 .5
FR 3 4 .3 3 0 .5 1 1 .1 1 2 .1 2 .7 0 .1 9 .2 0 .0
GE 4 0 .7 2 5 .4 5 .1 1 3 .2 4 .1 2 .7 4 .4 4 .4
IR 2 5 .4 4 1 .2 5 .6 1 1 .3 1 2 .2 1 .6 2 .6 0 .1
IT 4 8 .2 2 5 .3 5 .0 9 .8 2 .2 2 .4 5 .2 1 .9
NE 4 0 .0 2 8 .5 6 .5 1 3 .3 4 . 3 - 6 .3 1 .1
NO 4 0 .4 3 9 .4 4 .4 5 .3 1 .2 0 .3 7 .8 1 .2
sw 3 0 .8 4 2 .0 5 .1 4 .6 1 .1 0 .6 1 5 .8 0 .0
s z 5 2 .2 2 8 .7 0 .3 5 .4 1 .0 4 .2 8 .1 G .l
UK 3 4 .0 3 1 .7 2 .8 8 .4 3 .4 1 .2 1 7 .1 1 .4




























































































Among the other schemes the benefits for civil servants (10 % of 
total expenditures), the social assistance scheme ( 9 %), and 
family allowances ( 6 %) spend considerable sums. The expenditures 
for civil servants are extraordinarily high in Austria ( 20 %) , 
and particularly low in the Scandinavian countries except Finland, 
and in Switzerland (below or around 5 %) . The social assistance schane 
claims a sizeable share of resources in Denmark (24 %), the United 
Kingdom (17 %), and Sweden (16 %) , but plays only a residual role 
in Belgium (5 %), Germany ( 4 %), Austria ( 3 %), and Ireland ( 3 %). 
The share of the family allowance scheme is highest in the catholic 
countries, Belgium ( 12 %), France (11 %) , and Austria (9 %). It 
is lowest in the United Kingdom (3 %) and Switzerland (.3 %), but 
the Swiss case is largely a reflection of institutional peculiari­
ties . ®
The expenditure’s for unemployment closely vary with oscillations 
of the business cycle. Although outlays have been growing in all 
countries since the 1970s, only Denmark (14 %), Ireland (12 %), and 
Belgium (11 %) spend more than 10 % of their social security benefits 
for unemployment purposes. In all other countries unemployment 
expenditures remain far below 5 %. The outlays for occupational 
injuries weigh even less heavily. On average only 2 % of social 
security benefits go to the occupational injuries insurance system. 
Nowhere do expenditures surpass the level of 5 %. Other schemes 
are of some importance only in Germany, where a sizeable part of 
social benefits ( 4 %) is still spent for military and civilian war 
victims.
Differences in the methods of financing are another important 
source of diversity among the Western European welfare states (cf table 7) . 
On average about 39 % of all resources are contributed by employers, 
while 37 % are paid by the state (central and local authorities).
The protected persons themselves only contribute about 19 % of 
all resources. The remaining rest (scarcely 6 %) comes from income 
from capital and other sources. Since 1950 the state share in 
financing has been declining (from 45 to 37 %), whereas the shares 
of employers (36 to 39 %) and insured persons (16 to 19 %) have 
tended to increase. However, these changes primarily reflect the 
differential growth of schemes with different methods of financing 





























































































Table 7: The financing of social security schemes 
in percent of total receipts)
in 1977 (financing
Country Employees Employers State Other
NJ 26.4 48.6 22.5 2.5
BE 18.1 41.7 35.3 4.9
DE 1.4 5.5 91.4 1.7
FI 1 0 . 1 49.4 36.0 4.5
FR 19.4 55.7 23.2 1.7
GE 29.5 41.1 26.4 3.0
m 11.4 25.3 60.8 2.5
IT 13.5 61.2 2 1 . 2 4.1
NE 35.7 38.2 18.0 8 . 1
NO 2 1 . 8 39.5 37.3 1.4
SW 1 . 2 44.1 47.3 7.4
sz 36.7 2 2 .0 32.5 8.8
UK 17.7 29.5 50.5 2.3
Average 18.7 38.6 36.9 5.8
As the table shows the country-specific variation in the 
distribution of resources is considerable. Thus, the financing 
share of employed persons varies from 1% in Denmark to 37 % 
in Switzerland. Contributions from employers figure most prominently 
in Italy (61 %), France (56 %), Finland (49 %), and Austria (49 %), 
whereas they play a minor role in Switzerland (22 %) and Denmark 
(5.5 %). In the other countries they vary between 25 and 44 %.
The state share is overwhelming in Denmark (91 %), high in Ireland 
(61 %), the United Kingdom (50.5 %) and Sweden (47 %), but below 
25 % in France, Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands.
Locking at the over-all distribution of financing shares in the single countries, 
we can distinguish three patterns. First, there is a group of countries 
with a fairly equilibrated tripartite system of financing where no 
single source of revenues clearly dominates the others and where 
the protected persons themselves contribute at least one fourth of 
the funds (Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany, Austria). Second we 
have a group with predominantly bipartite financing by employers 
and the state where employers foot the major part of the bill 
(Italy, France, Finland, Belgium, Norway). Third, there is a group 
where the state share predominates and contributions from employers 



























































































Differences in the institutional type of the social security schemes
are a third major dimension of variation. Theoretically we may 
distinguish three basic models of social policies. Universal social 
security schemes seek to provide for a minimum level of economic 
security for all citizens independent of their status in the labour 
market. In these systems all residents are entitled to benefits, 
and the social transfers have a strong egalitarian component in which 
flat rate benefits play a prominent role even though they may be 
complemented with earnings-related supplements. Status preserving 
systems, on the other hand, define welfare entitlements in strict 
relation to the beneficiaries' status in the labour market. In these 
systems the social programmes are frequently fragmented into a 
variety of special schemes for various occupational categories.
Coverage is often tied to income-limits, and the earnings-related 
benefits transmit the relative position which the recipients have 
acquired in the labour market into the system of social transfers.
Thus they tend to preserve rather than modify the structure of 
social inequality. Finally, there is the selective model of social 
policy which seeks to reserve public benefits to indigent groups 
which have no or scarce potential of effective self-help. In this 
model the definition of entitlements is highly restrictive, but the 
benefits have a strong redistributive effect.
Although the third model figures prominently in recent political 
debates on the welfare state, it so far is of little practical 
relevance in Western Europe. None of the major welfare schemes is strictly 
selective in any of the countries studied here. Empirically only 
the social assistance programmes bear some resemblance to the model.
The universal and the status preserving types of social policies are, 
however, pursued in actual practice. In Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden,and the United Kingdom the social programmes are shaped 
according to universalistic criteria. The coverage of their 
schemes frequently embrace all residents, the programmes are 
administratively unified, and benefits combine flat rate and 
earnings-related components. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Italy, on the other hand, follow the status preservation approach.
In these countries the social security systems are institutionally 
split up into a variety of special programmes for different occupationa 
categories, coverage is often limited according to earnings, and 
the income-related benefits strongly reflect the position obtained 
in the labour market. The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Ireland 



























































































types. In the Netherlands and in Switzerland the pension schemes 
cover all residents, but the other programmes have income-limits 
for coverage or leave deliberately much space to voluntary 
security schemes by private associations. In Ireland only the 
family allowance scheme is universal in character, but flat rate 
benefits figure prominently in most programmes."^
The Western European welfare states thus display many common features 
together with important national variations. All countries have 
established public schemes of social security which were considerably 
expanded in the post-war period. Today the welfare state is a 
common structural element of all Western European democracies. In 
1977 even the country with the lowest GDP share of social expenditure 
(Switzerland) had reached a level of social outlays which 
no other European nation had attained before the mid-1960s. On 
the other hand, the dynamics of social expenditure growth differed 
markedly from country to country and the functional distribution 
of expenditures shows common elements together with distinct 
national patterns. The national systems of financing are widely 
discrepant and the institutional profiles of social policies show 
marked variation. Despite the common trend towards expansion 
the Western European welfare states do not seem to converge.
Both phenomena, common trends and national variations call for 
scholarly explanation. The social scientist studying the develop­
ment of the welfare state sees himself confronted with a host of 
questions: Why did social expenditures grow so strongly in the 
post-war period? Why did some nations increase social spending 
more strongly than others? How are different systems of financing 
related to divergent patterns of expansion? What are the consequences 
of welfare state growth for the cleavage structures of our societies? 
What is the impact of welfare state expansion on the functioning 
of the economy? How are different institutional arrangements 
related to varying patterns of expansion and to negative side-effects 
in the economic or the political sphere? In the following parts 
we can only take up some of these questions. Part II will examine 
some hypotheses on the causes of social expenditure growth and 
look for some possible sources of variations in the degree of 
expansion. Part III will then analyze in rudimentary form whether 
the nations with the highest growth of social expenditure were most 



























































































II Determinants of the growth of social expenditures
Although the social science literature on the welfare state has been 
blossoming in recent years, general theories of welfare state develop­
ment are still in short supply. Maybe we can distinguish three broad 
streams of theorizing, i.e. the Marxist tradition, the Durkheimian 
.tradition, and the perspective of political sociology. In the Marxist 
perspective the growth of the welfare state is rooted in the logic 
-of capitalist development. From a Durkheimian view the expansion 
of social policies reflects the weakening of social integration and 
the anomic tendencies in modern societies. In the perspective of 
political sociology the growth of the welfare state is the by-product 
of the changing power relations in Western countries where labour 
unions and left parties have increasingly gained influence on govern­
mental policies. Capitalism, anomie and social democratic reformism 
are thus respectively identified as the major sources of welfare 
state expansion. In the following paragraphs the basic traits of 
these theories shall be elaborated and then be subjected to some 
preliminary empirical analyses.^
According to marxist theories capitalist development is crisis prone 
in a triple sense which calls for welfare state expansion. First the 
profit motive leads to intensified exploitation which endangers the 
reproduction of labour. Therefore the state must step in with factory 
legislation, occupational injuries protection and health measures 
to guarantee the continuous reproduction of labour which in turn is 
the precondition for the production of surplus. Second the cyclic 
character of capitalist production leads to problems of oversupply which 
call for a stabilization of demand. A social transfer system of the 
state is therefore needed to maintain the purchasing power of groups 
void of earnings from work (unemployed, invalids, elderly persons).
Third the conflict-prone contradiction of capital and labour calls 
for constant efforts to maintain social control and preserve mass 
loyalty. If downswings of the business cycle liberate greater numbers 
of workers from the primary system of social control in the work 
sphere, a public system of secondary social control must be established 
in order to contain the potential for conflicts. Making the receipt of benefits con­
tingent uporr vaorious conditions the social security systems serve 
this function of social control while the granting of benefits keeps 
political discontent manageably low. In the marxist perspective, then, 
the welfare state grew in the Western European democracies mainly 
because they are capitalist societies. Examples of this argumentation 




























































































Narr/Offe (1976), Ginsburgh (1979), and Gough (1979).
In a Durkheimian perspective, the growth of the welfare state 
is related to the more general phenomenon of the weakening of 
social integration and the withering of the self-help potential 
of primary and secondary groups in modern societies. The loosening 
of social bonds between families and neighborhood circles liberates 
individual aspirations from limiting group restraints and thus 
leads to increasing hedonistic welfare demands. At the same time 
the weakening of family ties and the transitory character of 
social relations in times of growing mobility weaken the self- 
help potential of associations so that the rising aspirations 
increasingly turn to the state as the only potential source of 
effective assistance. This perspective which has a long-standing 
tradition in French sociology (cf Tocqueville, Durkheim) has 
recently been revived by Morris Janowitz (1976) , and by 
Peter Flora (1981).
The common denominator of the manifold theorems in the tradition 
of political sociology is that the growth of the welfare state 
is related to the democratic decision making process and to the 
increasing political impact of groups which have an interest in 
social transfer payments. Thus dependent workers
without property resources who have been the traditional target 
group of modern welfare programmes have consistently been gaining 
political influence. While the growth of trade unions and socialist 
parties have augmented their power resources, their relative 
importance in the electorate has been growing
with the decline of self-employment. At the same time the welfare 
clienteles for whom social transfers are the main source of income9have significantly increased their electoral strength. With the 
upgrading of political skills among the voting population in the 
course of educational expansion and the spread of modern mass 
media the mobilization potential of these groups rises to an 
extent which makes it increasingly difficult for governments to 
neglect their interests. The generality of the historical shift 
in power relations in favour of traditionally underprivileged 
classes may explain the general tendency towards welfare state 
expansion, while the differential degree to which their organizations 
actually hold or control political power should explain national 
variations in the growth patterns of social policies. This theoretical 




























































































is to some extent shared by marxist and non-raarxist authors 
alike (see, for example, Korpi (1978, 1980), Ginsburgh (1979), 
Wilensky (1975)).
If the marxist theory which relates welfare state development to
the logic of the capitalist mode of production were correct we
would expect to find significant differences in the development
of social security expenditure in Western European and Eastern
European countries. Appendix table 1 shows the development of
the social expenditure ratio in communist countries (no data
are available for Romania). Figure 1 compares this development
to the post-war experience of Western European countries by showing
the average values in Western and Eastern nations together with
10the respective maximum and minimum social expenditure ratios.
Figure 1; The post-war development of the social expenditure 





























































































Up to the mid 1960s social security expenditures in Eastern and 
Western Europe show very similar patterns of development. The 
average expenditure ratios of communist countries is only slightly 
below that of the capitalist democracies, while the ratio of the 
Eastern country with maximum social outlays (Czechoslovakia) 
closely corresponds to that of the leading Western nations (Germany, 
Belgium, Austria). The laggards of social security spending in the - 
East (Poland, Hungary) even slightly surpassed the spending efforts 
of Switzerland as the Western laggard. This basic similarity 
only begins to fade in the second half of the 1960s. The Eastern 
average ratio now increasingly falls below the average of the West. 
Czechoslovakia as the big spender among communist countries no 
longer holds the pace of spending in the leading Western countries 
(Austria, Netherlands, Sweden). Only the laggards of social 
spending in both contexts remain similar. In the 1970s, then, 
even the average expenditure ratio in the West surpasses the maximum 
value of the East, while the Eastern average falls below the 
values reached by Switzerland as the Western laggard.
In their present formulation theories of the marxist orthodoxy 
do not seem capable to explain these patterns. Obviously the welfare 
state schemes are no peculiarity of capitalist countries. In 
capitalist democracies as in communist people's democracies social 
security spending has been rising in the post-war period. Even the 
pace of growth was similar up to the second half of the 1960s, 
diverging only afterwards. Marxist authors may argue that the 
growing gap reflects the increased necessity of capitalist countries 
to secure mass loyalty after the end of the post-war reconstruction 
period, but in the light of the internal tensions in nations such 
as Poland and Czechoslovakia this argument seems less convincing 
than the possible counter-hypothesis which would suggest that the 
failure to extend the welfare schemes at a pace similar to Western 
nations is one of the roots of the repeated crises of social 
integration in the East.
Given the similarity of social expenditure development in the two 
first post-war decades the question is what made Western nations 
expand their welfare schemes so heavily since the second half of 
the 1960s. This is where theories of social integration may have 
some explanatory value. The phase of increased welfare state 
expansion indeed coincided with major changes of the two central 
institutions of social integration: the family, with a dramatic 




























































































1 1a massive expansion of educational participation. Both 
developments presumably enhanced insecurity and anomie whereas 
the weakening of family ties shifted the potential of effective 
social support to the state. If there is a systematic link between 
these changes and the development of the welfare state we should 
expect a tendency for countries with high family instability to 
experience the most outspoken growth of social expenditure.
Up to the mid-1960s crude divorce rates remained fairly constant 
in Western Europe. In a comparative perspective they were on a 
relatively high level in Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, on a 
relatively low level in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Britain, with the remaining countries close to the European 
average (cf Flora 1981). In 1965 there was no relationship between 
the level of family instability and the level of social expenditures 
(r= -.o5). In 1975 there was still no correspondence between 
the two developments (r= .09), but as the following cross-tabulation 
shows, countries with heavy increases in divorce rates between 
1965 and 1975 also tended to show the heaviest increases in 
social expenditure ratios in that period. The average growth of 
the expenditure ratio consistently increases from 6 . 2 percentage 
points in countries with little change in family instability to 
7.3 in the middle group and 8 . 8 percentage points in the group 
with highest increases in divorce rates.
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A closer examination of the relationship in the scatterplot
reproduced as figure 2 shows that similar changes in familiy
instability did not preclude discrepant patterns of welfare
state development. However, the correlation of both changes
is clearly positive (r= .45). Excluding the deviant case of
the United Kingdom the correlation coefficient would even go 14up to .79. The weakening of social integration with the rapid 
increase of family instability since the mid-1960s in fact 
appears as one of the roots of accelerated welfare state 
expansion.




























































































Anomie theories of welfare state growth cannot explain, however, 
why individual countries increased social outlays in greater 
independence from the weakening of social integration than others.
The perspective of political sociology would suggest that this 
may at least partly be related to the varying power relations in 
different national settings. If it is true that the degree of 
welfare state expansion is a function of the power resources of 
the underprivileged classes, and if socialist participation in 
government strengthens their power position we would expect 
diverse growth patterns of social expenditure to reflect the 
partisan composition of governments.
Bie conventional strategy to test this hypothesis consists of static cross-sectional
comparisons of the social expenditure ratios in countries with
different lengths of socialist representation in cabinets.
Based on our time-series data we can here analyze more specifically
if different party governments had an impact on the annual changes
of social outlays (relative to GDP) in the Western European
nations. Appendix table 3 gives the data on the composition of i 5cabinets. Table 9 shows how social expenditures grew under 
different governments in each country. Cabinets classified as 
centre-right consist of conservative, Christian democratic or 
liberal parties excluding parties of the left. Centre-left coalitions 
refer to cabinets in which workers' parties participated in a 
minority position. Left-centre governments are either coalition 
cabinets with socialist dominance or cabinets exclusively controlled 
by left parties.
Table 9 shows that the welfare state grew under all types of 
governments, but that left cabinets tended to increase the social 
expenditure ratio markedly stronger than cabinets which excluded 
socialist parties or centre-left coalitions (.57, .42, and .36 
percentage points per year, respectively). The difference between 
single party cabinets of the left and of the right is particularly 
striking (.53 vs. .20). Participation of liberal or conservative 
parties in cabinets dominated by socialists did apparently not 
contain welfare state development. In fact the social expenditure 
ratio grew even stronger under left coalition governments than 
when socialist parties ruled alone (.61 vs. .53). Centre-right 
coalitions also promoted social expenditure growth in a more 
pronounced way than cabinets formed by a single "bourgeois" party 
(.55 vs. .20). The growth of social spending under centre-right 

















































































































AU .48 ( 4) .48(4) — .29(16) .21 (8) — . 2 1 (8) .29
BE .76(13) .43(4) .91(9) .26(10) .28(5) .28(5) - .50
DE •74( 8) .1 0 (1 ) .83(7) - .50(20) .30(8) .63(12) .57
FI .30(11) -.10(3) .45(8) .51( 8) .53 ( 9) .53(9) - .44
FR .53(22) - .53(22) .03( 3) - - - .47
GE .08(16) - .08(16) .10( 3) .73(8) .73(8) - .27
IR .21 (17) .21 (17) - .71 ( 7) - - - .35
n 1) .33(11) .11(7) .70(4) .35( 8) .83(9) .83 (9) - .50
NE .63(12) - .63(12) .32 ( 9) 1.06(7) 1.06(7) - .64
NO .85( 6) - .85(6) - .45(22) .60(4) .41 (18) .53
sw 3.10( 1) - 3.10(1) - .71(27) .47(6) .78(21) .80
sz .20 ( 6) - .2 0(6) .41 (20) - - - .36
UK .16(16) .16(16) - - .36(11) - .36(11) .24
Average .42(143).20(52) .55(91) .36(84) .57(126) .61(56) .53(70) .46
Average yearly increases (in brackets : number of years with respective 
government).
1) Special classification; centre-left: including social danocrats, excluding 




























































































dominated by left parties. Among the coalition cabinets only 
centre-left governments did not record enhanced social expenditure 
growth. Under centre-left rule the social expenditure ratio 
increased in fact even less than under centre-right governments 
(.36 vs. .42) .
The general tendency for a stronger growth of social expenditure
ratios under governments of the left is confirmed for seven
1 6individual countries. Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Norway 
experienced higher increases of the GDP share of social outlays when 
parties of the right were in pcwer. The two Scandinavian countries demonstrate 
most clearly how misleading conclusions based on cross-sectional 
analyses can be. Although both countries were mostly governed by the 
left,a sizeable part of social expenditure growth occurred under 
liberal/conservative rule. In France and Sweden social outlays 
also grew more markedly when parties of the "right" were in power, 
but due to the overproportionate dominance of only one type of 
party government both countries offer little basis for systematic 
comparisons of welfare state developments under different cabinets.
Changes of the social expenditure ratio reflect to a large extent 
changes in economic output. If economic growth is low,increases 
of social spending find much more easily expression in rising 
expenditure ratios than in times of prosperity. It cannot be 
excluded, therefore, that left governments appear as promoters 
of welfare state development simply because they were in power 
when economic growth was slackening. To control for the impact 
of different economic contexts table 1 0 examines the increases 
of the social expenditure ratios under various governments on 
a yearly basis (neglecting the different national contexts).
Also this analysis confirms the enhanced growth of social expenditure 
under governments which were dominated by socialist parties. In 
12 of the 28 years since the war expenditure ratios increased most 
strongly under left-centre coalitions. Nine years saw the strongest 
growth when centre-left cabinets were in power. Centre-right 
governments without socialist participation reported the highest 
incerases of social spending effort only in 7 of the 28 years.
While they had the lowest increases in 10 of the years under.study, 
socialist dominated cabinets reported the lowest dynamic of 
social expenditure growth only in 5 years (with one tie). The 
foilwing cross-tabulation shows the rank-order of annual increases 




























































































Table 10: Phase-specific increases of the social expenditure ratio under
different governments
Year CENTRE-RIGHT CENTRE-LEFT LEFT-CENTRE Average
1977 1.38 (4) -.30 (2) .31 (7) .55
1976 .80 (3) .70 (3) .79 (7) .77
1975 1.45 (4) 2.55 (2) 1.81 (7) 1.82
1974 .40 (3) 1.40 (2) 1.08 (8) .97
1973 .30 (3) .38 (4) .30 (6) .32
1972 .55 (4) .87 (3) .65 (6) .67
1971 1.08 (5) .60 (3) 1.14 (5) .99
1970 .56 (5) . 1 0 (3) - . 1 0 (5) .20
1969 .40 (6) .00 (3) .25 (4) .26
1968 .66 (7) -.25 (2) .88 (4) .58
1967 .95 (6) .95 (2) .38 (5) .73
1966 .45 (6) .75 (2) 1.16 (5) .77
1965 .45 (4) .78 (4) .32 (5) .50
1964 .32 (6) .07 (3) .38 (4) .25
1963 .47 (6) .33 (4) .57 (3) .45
1962 .33 (6) .35 (4) .80 (3) .45
1961 .14 (7) .37 (3) - . 1 0 (3) .14
1960 -.30 (8) -.40 (2) -.23 (3) -.30
1959 .08 (9) . 1 0 (1 ) .20 (3) . 1 2
1958 .47 (6) .55 (2) .98 (5) .68
1957 .60 (6) . 1 0 (2) .60 (5) .52
1956 .23 (3) .20 (5) .20 (5) .21
1955 -.08 (4) - . 2 0 (5) . 1 2 (4) -.06
1954 - . 0 2 (5) -.18 (4) .20 (4) .00
1953 .48 (6) .18 (4) .70 (2) .42
1952 .54 (5) .90 (4) .60 (2) .68
1951 -.48 (4) .03 (3) -.23 (3) -.25
1950 .30 (2) .37 (3) .20 (3) .29
Average annual changes in percentage points (in brackets: number of 




























































































Table 11: Rank-order of annual social expenditure ratio increases under
different governments (no of years on each rank)
Rank
Centre-right Centre-left Left-centre Years
1 7 9 12 28
2 11 6.5 10.5 28
3 10 12.5 5.5 28
Years 28 28 28
The impact of the party composition of government apparently 
diminished over time. In the 1970s there was in fact only one 
year in which the social expenditure ratio grew strongest under 
left-centre cabinets (1971). In the 1960s and 1950s, on the other 
hand, six and five (one tie) of the ten years witnessed strongest 
increases of social spending when governments of the left were 
in power. Accordingly, centre-right governments reported the 
most heavy increases only in one year (with one tie) in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but in three of the eight years in the 1970s. As the 
following comparison of the average annual increases under each 
type of government shows, the social expenditure ratio grew most 
heavily under left-centre governments in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but not in the 1970s when centre-right governments took the lead. 
Centre-left governmerts consistently experienced the lowest annual 
increases. The differences between the more dynamic and the most 
stagnant group consistently decreased from one decade to the other.
Table 12: Average annual increases of the social expenditure ratio under 
various governments in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
Centre-right Centre-left Left-centre
Decade
1950s .24 .19 .37
1960s .36 .30 .47




























































































Contrary to an hypothessis advanced by Heclo (1981) according to
which partisan conflicts shape social policies most noticeably
in times of austerity,, the impact of parties thus diminished with
the decrease in economic growth rates in the 1970s.^ To validate
the theoretical significance of such empirical findings we
thoroughly need more systematic replications. Thus it would have
to be examined if the absolute increases of social outlays (at
constant prices) vary similarly with the partisan complexion of
government.. As has already been pointed out, the social expenditure .
ratio can give only very crude indications of the social policy
efforts of different governments, because the ratio is influenced
by a host of non-political disturbance factors. So far not even
the analyses which rely on this same indicator of social policy
effort have arrived at unanimous results. Thus the findings of
our analyses concur with the results obtained by David Cameron (1981)
but differ from the outcomes of a recent analysis of social
expenditure developments in Western Europe done by Kohl (1981).
Kohl finds the same hesitant growth of social expenditure under
single party governments of the right, but does not confirm the
overproportionate increase under left-centre governments. Most of
this discrepancy is due to a deviant practice in the classification 
1 8of cabinets , but the considerable heterogeneity of empirical 
findings clearly points to the necessity of systematic replications 
if we are to obtain cumulative insight into the dynamics of welfare 
state development. Before we come back to a discussion of some 
fruitful strategies for future research, the following section 
briefly examines some of the economic consequences of the growth 
of social expenditures.
Ill Some economic consequences of social expenditure development
In recent years the welfare state has increasingly come under attack
from critics who charge that the dynamic growth of social expenditure
hampers the functioning of the economy. Authors of liberal
and marxist political leanings are united in the challenge that the
upsurge of social spending has diverted resources from investment
to consumption, lowered the profit rates, increased public deficits
and inflation rates, and contributed to the erosion of economic 
19growth. Given the immediate political repercussions of these 
debates it is not always easy to separate scholarly analysis from 
political attempts to influence public opinion. The problem of the 




























































































is that the hypotheses on negative side-effects frequently lack 
sophistication and are much easier maintained in theory than 
sustained in empirical research.
The empirical studies undertaken so far have contributed much 
to promote a more differentiated scholarly debate. Thus, Geiger 
and Geiger (1978) point to the fact that welfare and efficiency 
need not necessarily be seen as a tradeoff or zero-sum game. They 
draw attention to the unprecedented increases in both welfare 
and efficiency over the past hundred years which attest that there 
may be a positive-sum interaction between the growth of the 
welfare state and economic prosperity. Based on a study of six 
European welfare states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom) the authors try to distinguish types 
of welfare arrangements and methods of financing which may interact 
positively with the productivity of the market sector from types 
which hamper the functioning of the economy. In a study of 19 
OECD nations Cameron (1981) comes to the conclusion that countries 
with extensive social spending tended to have lower rates of 
economic growth, higher public deficits and a higher erosion of 
investment rates than less developed welfare states. On the other 
hand, he finds that high social spending helped to restrain wage- 
claims and to keep inflation relatively low. Cameron therefore 
concludes that "rather than being incompatible with, and harmful 
to capitalism, a large and expanding welfare state may be beneficial 
and helpful to a capitalist economy, and to the very groups that 
are most critical of it." (Cameron 1981:26).
It cannot be denied that the upsurge of social spending since
the mid-1960s was accompanied by a decline in economic growth rates.
In the Western European countries studied here real economic
growth averaged 4.0 % in the 1950s, 4.9 % in the 1960s, but only
203.4 % in the 1970s. The theoretical problem is whether such 
changes indicate crisis tendencies in welfare states or crisis 
tendencies of the welfare state itself. In other words, we still 
need to know whether the European nations which happen to be 
welfare states are confronted with general economic problems such 
as a beginning saturation of demand, increasing competition from 
developing countries, high exchange rates of the dollar and the like, 
or whether they increasingly run into economic difficulties 
because they have expanded the welfare state beyond reasonable 
limits. If the latter is the case, we would expect those countries 




























































































greatest and most rapid extension in recent years.
As could.be shown in part I, the Western European welfare states of the late
1970s may be readily subdivided into three groups: those with
low levels of social spending and low to moderate growth of social
outlays in the 1970s (United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, Ireland,
Switzerland), those with intermediate levels and moderate growth
(Austria, Germany, Italy), and those with high social expenditure
ratios and high increases of social spending (Sweden, Netherlands,
France, Belgium, and Denmark). If the hypothesis of a crisis of
the welfare state is correct, the countries in the last named group
are clear candidates for economic problems. Table 13 examines
21if they were indeed more crisis-prone than the others.





UK, NO, FI, IR, SZ 
( UK, NO, AU)
Medium 
AU, GE, IT 
(FI, LR, SZ, GE, IT)
High
(SW, NE, FR, BE, DE) 
(SW, NE, FR, BE, DE;
2 2 * 7 0 7 7 \  3 - 1 (3'8) 3.6 (3.0) 3.4 (3.4)
inflation 
rates,. 70-77 10.6 (9.3) 8.5 (10.1) 8.6 (8.6)
Deficit 
levels 1977 45.5 (45.4) 37.7 (40.8) 34.1 (34.1)
Debt service 
1977 6.2 (5.9) 5.9 (6.2) 4.2 (4.2)
Deficit 
increase 70-77 128 (162) 206 (155) 120 (120)
Deficit ratio 
increase 70-77 4.0 (-.3) 15.4 (9.8) - 4.7(-4.7)
Without brackets: Classification according to levels of spending (cf table 5)
In brackets: Classification according to growth of expenditure ratio (cf table 5) 
x) Growth: Average annual growth rates 1970-77; inflation: average annual inflation 
rates 1970-77; Deficit levels: Public deficit as % of GDP; Debt service:
Interest on public debt of central government; Deficit increase: Increase 
of public debt at constant prices, 1970 = 100; Deficit ratio increase: growth 
of public deficit as % of GDP in percentage points from 1970 to 1977.
In summary, the countries with high or rapid welfare state development 
In the 1970s had similar economic growth rates.as the nations with 
more restrained social spending, but they tended to have lower 
inflation rates, lower public deficits with lower debt service, and 
lower increases of deficits between 1970 and 1977. The data on the 




























































































relationship between levels of social spending and deficits in 
1970 (r = -.02), by 1977 nations with restrained social expenditures 
tended to experience higher deficits ( r = -.23). On average 
public debt in the Western European countries amounted to 39 % of 
GDP in 1977. Among the five leading welfare states only Belgium (54 %) 
surpassed this average value, whereas France (14 %) and Denmark (25 %) 
clearly remained below. The Swedish (37 %) and Dutch (39 %) deficits 
closely corresponded to the European average. The mean deficit in 
the group of most developed welfare states (34 %) thus remained 
distinctly below the Western European average. Among the least 
developed welfare states, on the other hand, public deficits 
averaged 45.5 % of GDP, and only Finland (9 %) fell clearly below 
the European mean.
Since the level of deficits reflects to a large extent national 
traditions of public debt, an examination of deficit changes in the 
1970s is a more reliable judge of the economic consequences of 
welfare state development. On average public deficits at constant 
prices climbed from an index value of 100 in 1970 to 143 in 1977.
This corresponded to a mean increase of the debt level of 1.9 
percentage points of GDP. Among the six countries with above 
average increases of deficits (Italy, Austria, Norway, Germany, 
Denmark, and Ireland-in the order of increases) only Denmark had 
experienced a high growth of social expenditures in the 1970s.
The five most dynamically growing welfare states (Sweden, Netherlands, 
France, Belgium, Denmark) reported a far lower average increase in 
public deficits than the other nations (mean growth from 1 0 0 to 1 2 0  
with a corresponding average reduction of the deficit burden by 
4.7 percentage points of GDP). The five nations with intermediate 
increases of social expenditure (Finland, Ireland, Switzerland,
Germany, Italy) also had an intermediate average increase of 
deficits (from 100 to 155), while the three countries with the 
lowest growth of the social expenditure ratio (United Kingdom,
Austria, and Norway) surprisingly had the highest average increase 
of the public debt (from 100 to 162). In this group the deficits 
of Austria and Norway increased at a speed far above the European 
average, while only the United Kingdom was able to reduce its 
traditionally high debt burden in the context of low social expenditure 
growth. Consequently, the overall relationship between social 
expenditure ratio growth and deficit increase in the 1970s is 




























































































The accusation that welfare state growth is one of the most important
sources of inflation also lacks empirical substantiation. The four
countries in which inflation rates were above 10 % in the 1970s -
Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Finland - all had low or moderate
increases of the social expenditure ratio. While the overall
relationship between the growth of social spending and inflation
is practically zero ( r= -.04), the average inflation rate in the
most dynamically growing welfare states was lower (8 . 6 %) than the
inflation rate in countries with moderate (1 0 .1 ) or low welfare
state growth (9.3). Only economic growth rates tended to be slightly
higher in the 1970s in countries which kept social expenditure
22growth low (r = -.18). However, the lowest economic growth rates 
were recorded in Switzerland (1.5 %) and the United Kingdom (2.2) 
which did not expand social expenditures heavily. Among the 
dynamically growing welfare states only Sweden (2.3) and Denmark (3.0) 
had economic growth rates below the Western European average, while 
the other three countries-Belgium, France, and the Netherlands - 
all were above the mean rate of economic growth (3.4 %).
In empirical analyses of the concomitant variations of social 
expenditure growth and economic problems the charge that the welfare 
state is the main source of economic crisis symptoms thus receives 
little substantiation. This does not preclude, however, that 
heavy welfare state growth leads to negative side-effects in 
subsequent periods. In this respect the experience of nations
which expanded social expenditures despite moderate economic growth 
in the 1970s would deserve particular attention. Such an analysis 
would go beyond the scope of this paper, however. The following 
section shall instead summarize the major results of the analyses 
undertaken here and discuss some avenues for future research.
IV Discussion of results and prospects for future research
The welfare state has become a central structural element of all 
Western European societies. In the post-war period all nations 
witnessed an impressive growth of social outlays, so that the average 
social expenditure ratio more than doubled from 9 to 22 % of GDP.
Since the second half of the 1960s all countries experienced an 
accelerated growth of social programmes which began to slow down 
again only in the second half of the 1970s.
Despite this common growth trend of social spending the Western 




























































































Expenditures grew to a different extent and at varying speeds, 
and their structural composition shows marked national variations 
beside common elements. Important national differences also 
persist in the financing of the welfare state programmes. Whereas 
some countries predominantly rely on state revenues, others oblige 
employers or employed persons to bear most of the cost. Finally, 
the institutional types of the programmes vary. Some national 
welfare states aim at the preservation of the social status achieved 
in the labour market as their prime target whereas others seek to 
secure similar (minimum) standards of living for all citizens.
Common trends as well as national variations need scholarly 
explanation. In this paper only determinants of the growth of 
social expenditure were examined neglecting the causes for the 
emergence of different patterns of financing or different 
institutional models of social policies. Marxist theories which 
understand the welfare state as a specific characteristic of 
capitalist societies received little empirical support. Social 
security schemes were also established and extended in the 
communist countries of Eastern Europe where they showed a very 
similar pattern of growth up to the mid-1960s. Only since then 
has the growth of social expenditure been distinctly higher in 
Western European nations. Whether this is a consequence of a 
greater responsiveness of democratic regimes or of specific 
political or economic prerequisites of "late-capitalist" societies 
needs further study. Detailed system comparisons of the institutional 
shaping of social programmes in Eastern and Western nations 
would be of significant theoretical interest. Maybe paired 
comparisons of countries with similar historical traditions- 
e.g. France/Poland, Netherlands/Czechoslovakia, the two Germanies - 
would best promote further understanding.
Within the Western European nations the growth of the welfare 
state was related to the weakening of social integration and to 
the partisan control of government. Countries with high increases 
in divorce rates tended to experience also relatively high 
increases in the social expenditure ratio. Anomie theories in the 
tradition of Durkheim would see this as evidence that the dissolution 
of primary groups has liberated hedonistic aspirations and 
weakened the self-help potential of associations, leaving the 
state as the only agent which can effectively fulfill security 
functions. However, family instability taps only one dimension 




























































































weakening of family ties is itself a precondition for a decay 
of "amoral familism" and a subsequent enhancement of solidaristic 
values which in turn lead to public demands for welfare state 
expansion. The interplay between patterns of social integration, 
changing attitudes and security needs, and the value bases of 
increasing welfare demands - hedonistic consumerism or enhanced 
social solidarity - clearly needs more intensive study. An 
impressionistic overview of developments in the most recent past 
would suggest that the steep increase in divorce rates was 
accompanied by a mushrooming of self-help groups which seek to 
substitute welfare state programmes by new forms of social help 
rather than to expand them.
The hypothesis which relates welfare state growth to social 
democratic reformism or the increasing power resources of the 
working class received rather strong empirical support. Although 
all parties of the broad democratic centre contributed to welfare 
state growth in Western Europe, governments headed by workers' 
parties recorded heavier increases of the social expenditure ratio 
than governments which excluded left parties. The higher growth 
of .social spending under left governments was substantiated regard­
less whether the nation-specific impact of various governments 
(neglecting the time context) or the phase-specific impact 
(neglecting national contexts) was examined. However, the impact 
of the party composition of governments diminished over time, 
being less marked in the 1970s than in the 1960s and 1950s.
To validate the results of the analyses undertaken here they should 
be replicated with alternative operationalizations of the dependent 
variable for the same group of countries. The social expenditure 
ratio studied here is probably the most widely used but certainly 
also the crudest indicator of welfare state effort. As a fraction 
it reflects changes of social outlays in the calculator as well 
as changes of GDP in the nominator. The first step should therefore 
consist of isolating changes in social outlays from changes in 
economic output by studying the annual change rates of social 
spending at constant prices. Even such changes, however, do not 
lend themselves easily to theoretical interpretation. Obviously, 
social expenditures do not only grow because responsive governments 
increase the state supply of social benefits,but also because 
the distribution of risks and societal needs changes. If social 
spending rises faster under one type of government than another, 




























































































efforts of this particular government are therefore rather 
precipitate. It may simply be that risks such as unemployment, 
invalidity or ill health spread faster or wider under certain 
governments. Unequivocal theoretical interpretations of the 
causes of social expenditure growth presuppose a conceptual 
clarification of the various components of such growth and a 
more precise definition of the dependent variable which is to 
measure social policies.
An important contribution to such clarification has been made 
by the OECD Studies on Resource Allocation (cf OECD 1976). The 
OECD distinguishes three components of social expenditure develop­
ment which it calls "demographic ratio", "eligibility ratio", 
and "transfer ratio". The demographic ratio specifies the 
percentage of the population exposed to a given risk (e.g. the 
percentage of elderly people). The eligibility ratio states 
what percentage of the population under risk actually receives 
social benefits (e.g. pensioners as percent of the elderly).
The transfer ratio, finally, expresses the benefit expenditure 
per beneficiary as a percentage of the gross domestic product 
per capita. This distinction allows to express the social 
expenditure ratio as a product of the three components and
to calculate the contribution made by each component to changes 
23in the ratio. Based on data for 1962 and 1972 the OECD comes 
to the conclusion that roughly one third of the growth of the 
social expenditure ratio is due to demographic changes, whereas 
scarcely two thirds are due to extensions of eligibilty. Only the small 
remaining rest reflects increases in average benefits.
The OECD studies have certainly contributed significantly to a 
better understanding of the dynamics of social expenditure . Their 
great merit lies in the empirical demonstration of the fact that 
deliberate political interventions are only one factor in the 
growth of social outlays among others, and that a sizeable part 
of the increase is due to non-legislated,automatic or "built-in" 
growth tendencies of welfare programmes. Even the OECD approach 
does not sufficiently distinguish between voluntary political 
and automatic non-political growth tendencies, however. Also the 
eligibility ratio and the transfer ratio which the organization 
interprets as indicators of deliberate government interventions 
may change independently of political action. Thus, the eligibility 
ratio may reflect the different strength of age cohorts entering into 




























































































transfer ratio automatically goes down if the number of 
beneficiaries grows faster than the total population (other 
factors being equal). Sound assessments of the social policy 
effort of different governments or regimes thus require an even 
more concise distinction between politically induced changes 
and automatic growth tendencies of social outlays. Studies of 
legislative developments seem to be the only approach which 
guarantees that the impact of political forces is analyzed in 
an unequivocal way.
In the study of institutional developments we should further 
distinguish between two types of legislation. On the one hand 
there are laws which simply serve to preserve the traditional 
character of social programmes by adapting them to changing 
social conditions such as inflationary changes in purchasing 
power. Such laws keep social expenditures "running in order simply to 
stand still" (Gough 1979: 93). On the other hand, there are 
acts which actually modify existing institutional regulations, 
either by improving or by cutting benefits. Detlev Zollner (1963) who 
first introduced this distinction, calls the first type "adaptive", 
the second "inductive" legislation.
Based on these considerations we can develop a typology of 
changes in social security systems which distinguishes between 
deliberate interventions and automatic change tendencies caused 
by factors beyond the immediate control of governments. Figure 3 
gives an overview of factors relevant to social expenditure 
development. The outlays of social security systems are a 
function of changes in four dimensions: (1) the number of covered 
risks (scope); (2) the membership of a given programme (coverage);
(3) the number of beneficiaries (eligibility); and the 
quality of the benefits (generosity). Within these dimensions 
the typology seeks to distinguish between changes induced by 
institutional modifications and automatic or built-in change 
tendencies (see figure 3 next page).
As the typology incorporates Zollner's distinction between
adaptive and inductive legislative regulations it also opens the 
possibility to operationalize the much used but rarely clarified 
concept of political non-decisions: If the adaptive regulations 
named in the chart are not realized despite the enumerated 
changes in the environment, social programmes suffer an 
effective curtailment due to the non-realization of political 




























































































F igu re j :  A typ ology o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and au tom atic  change f a c to r s  in  s o c ia l  exp en d itu re  development
Dimensions o f 
change
Autom atic fa c to r s  o f  change 
w ithout l e g i s l a t i v e  
in te r v e n t io n s  ( b u i l t - i n  
change te n d e n cie s  o f  s o c ia l  
programmes)
I n s t i t u t i o n :  
A daptive l e g i s la t io n
1 M o d i f i c a t i o n s  
In d u ctiv e  l e g i s la t io n
• Covered r i s k s  
(  SCOPE o f programmes)
•
In tro d u c tio n  o f new programmes 
or ty p es  o f b e n e f i t s  to  cover 
a d d it io n a l r is k s
Membership o f th e  system s 
(COVERAGE)
Changes o f wages (throu gh 
i n f l a t i o n  or c o l l e c t i v e  
b a rg a in in g ) ;
s t r u c t u r a l  changes o f th e  
econ om ically  a c t iv e  popula­
t io n  (w here coverage i s  t ie d  
to  o ccu p a tio n a l s t a t u s ) ;  
c y c l i c a l  f lu c tu a t io n s  o f th e  
labou r fo r c e
A daptation o f in c o m e -lim its  
fo r  compulsory coverage to  
changes in  wage le v e ls  
(k eep in g  th e  p ercen tag e  o f 
th e  covered labou r fo r c e  
c o n s ta n t)
L im ita tio n  or ex te n sio n  o f 
compulsory coverage to  s p e c i f i c  
s o c i a l  c a te g o r ie s ;  
r e a l  m o d ific a tio n s  o f incom e- 
l im i t s  fo r  compulsory coverage 
(  changing th e  r e la t io n s h ip  
between in c o m e -lim it and average 
wage)
Number o f
b e n e f i c ia r ie s
(ELIG IBILITY )
Demographic changes (v a ry in g  
s iz e s  o f  age c o h o rts  in  
p en sion ab le  a g e ) ; 
b u sin e ss  c y c le s  changing th e  
number o f unemployed p e rso n s ; 
changing income l e v e l s ;  
changing d is t r ib u t io n  o f r is k s  
in  th e  cou rse  o f s o c io ­
economic development (new 
d is e a s e s ,  in d u s t r ia l  a c c id e n ts  
e t c . )
A daptation o f in c o m e -lim its  
d e fin in g  e n tit le m e n t to  
b e n e f i t s  to  changes in  wage 
le v e ls
M o d ifica tio n  o f q u a lify in g  
c o n d itio n s  (chang es o f q u a lify in g  
or w a itin g  p e r io d s ) ;  
ex te n sio n  o f  e n tit le m e n ts  to  
fam ily  members o f d i r e c t l y  covered 
persons
Q u a lity  o f b e n e f i t s  
(GENEROSITY)
Changes o f c o s t  o f  l iv in g  or 
wages;
c o s t  in c r e a s e s  ( s a l a r i e s  o f 
s o c ia l  b u r e a u c ra c ie s , tech no­
lo g ic a l  change in  m ed icine, 
p u b lic  s e c to r  i n f la t io n  e t c . )
B e n e f it  supplem ents to  cover 
i n f l a t i o n ;
in d ex a tio n  o f b e n e f i t s  to  
changes in  p r ic e s  or wages
Real m o d ific a tio n s  o f b e n e f i t  
l e v e l s  changing th e  e a rn in g s -  
replacem ent r a t io s  o f  t r a n s f e r s ;  
p ro lo n g a tio n  or sh o rte n in g  o f 




























































































the annual development of social security programmes into 
five types: (1) expansion based on inductive regulations in
one or several of the four dimensions; (2) adaptive changes 
based on interventions which preserve the status-quo in the 
context of environmental changes; (3) politically neutral 
changes based on environmental factors; (4) voluntary curtailment 
based on non-decisions in the presence of external changes;
(5) deliberate dismantling through inductive legislation of 
cuts.
Once the annual change rates of social outlays at constant 
prices and the institutional developments of social policies 
have been studied, a third promising avenue for future research 
could consist of the analysis of the varying growth dynamics 
of different institutional types of the welfare state. Thus the 
growth profiles of systems with different methods of financing 
or different social policy models (universal or status-preserving) 
should be systematically compared. This type of analysis would 
probably be of the most immediate relevance to policy makers.
Studies of the consequences of welfare state growth should be 
developed along similar lines. The crude analyses undertaken 
here could only show that the linkage between economic problems 
and the growth of social expenditure is not as straightforward 
as some currently fashionable theories maintain. The most 
developed Western European welfare states in fact faced less 
severe economic problems than countries which had moderate 
levels and slow growth of social expenditure in the 1970s.
This does not prove, however, that the growth of social spending 
does not produce negative economic side-effects. To promote a 
better understanding of the consequences of welfare state develop­
ment, two types of empirical research appear potentially fruitful. 
First, economic consequences should be studied in more detail, 
taking into consideration not only the various methods of 
financing in welfare states with similar expenditure levels, 
but also the impact of other variables affecting economic 
outcomes such as exchange and interest rates. This quest
for multivariate analysis does not necessarily mean that the 
number of countries under study must be augmented. Given the 
immense problems of international comparability of nationally 
collected statistics, detailed systematic studies of few (two to 
four) countries may, on the contrary, be more telling than 




























































































Second, studies of the economic consequences of welfare state growth need 
complementation by studies of its political and social consequences. 
If the welfare state increasingly weakens social solidarity, 
creates social cleavages and produces adverse economic effects, 
we should indeed ponder upon a deep-reaching institutional 
restructuring. If, on the other hand, lower economic growth rates 
and higher inflation should prove to be a price to be paid for 
the preservation of a high degree of social integration and 
political legitimacy, the evaluation of present welfare state 
arrangements would appear in another light. This and similar 
questions urgently call for empirical analyses which help to 
replace the abundance of diffuse ideological convictions by 
some more differentiated rational insights.
it impossible tc assess the quality of the data or the context-























































































































































































1 See, for example, Flora/Heidenheimer (1981).
2 For a comparative historical analysis of the development of 
the Western European social insurance schemes in the past 
hundred years see Alber (1982).
3 All data presented here were compiled frcm various editions
of the I.L.O. series "The cost of social security". Percentages 
rest on absolute figures which are presented together with 
explanatory footnotes in the forthcoming data-handbook of 
the HIWED-project (Flora et al. 1982). As the HIWED-collection 
ends in 1974, social expenditure ratios for the years 
1974-77 are directly taken from the tenth edition of the 
I.L.O. series.
4 Since the ratio is a function of both, social spending in the 
calculator and GDP in the denominator, this does not preclude 
that the growth rate of social outlays in absolute terms
(at constant prices) has been declining over the post-war 
years. Other research by this author has shown that this 
has indeed been the case in West Germany (see Alber 1980).
5 These variations partly reflect institutional differences. 
Whereas invalidity pensions generally form part of the pension 
system, Belgium provides for invalidity under the sickness 
insurance system. None of the national schemes is fully 
comparable in the sense that identically labelled institutions 
also serve identical functions. Varying expenditure shares
of civil servants' schemes, for example, may simply reflect 
the degree to which civil servants' benefits are incorporated 
into general security schemes rather than being administered 
separately.
6 The Swiss figures refer only to the federal scheme.
7 The information in this paragraph relates to the situation 
in the late 1970s (cf. USHEW 1977).
8 For a more extensive discussion of various theories of 
welfare state development and their confrontation with 
empirical findings in a longer historical perspective from 
the establishment of the first social insurance schemes to 
1975 see Alber (1982) .
9 In West Germany persons depending on social transfers as their 
main source of income represented 19 % of the electorate in 
1960, but 26 % in 1980 (cf Alber 1982a).
10 The expenditure ratios in Eastern European countries express 
social security spending as a percentage of the net material 
product. Since it excludes the service sector, this concept
is not fully comparable to the Western gross domestic product, 
but this sould not seriously hamper comparisons of developments 
over time.
11 For an extensive discussion of social changes in Western 
Europe since the Second World War see Flora (1981a).
12 Based on eleven countries, as Ireland and Italy had not 
legalized divorce (see appendix table 2).
13 The analysis refers to 1975 (rather than to 1977) because the 
HIWED-collection on divorce rates ends in 1975.
14 The divorce rates for Britain refer to England and Wales only. 
Including Scotland and Northern Ireland, the growth in 




























































































15 The classification is based on a data collection on the 
composition of cabinets since World War I which the author 
compiled for the HIWED data-handbook (cf Flora et al. 1982).
16 This includes Switzerland with its peculiar system of govern­
ment for which the notion of cabinet composition is not fully 
adequate. Excluding Switzerland from the calculation of 
European averages all reported tendencies would remain identical
17 See the information on the post-war development of economic 
growth rates on p. 25 .
18 Although he departs from (a preliminary version of) the same 
data set on cabinets used here, Kohl uses a different 
classification scheme which reserves the label "centre-left" 
or "left" to very few governments. Thus the great coalition 
of Austria is here classified as "centre-left" to denote 
socialist participation in a government dominated by the 
conservative "Volkspartei", whereas it is classified as "centre" 
by Kohl. Similarly socialist participation in Dutch cabinets
is labelled "centre" by Kohl, but "centre-left" or "left" (if 
dominated by the workers' party) here. Deviating from our 
practice Kohl also classifies the "centro-sinistra" cabinets 
of Italy together with the other Italian governments as 
"centre-right". In addition, his data on social transfers are 
taken from the OECD, and are not fully comparable with the 
I.L.O. data used here.
19 For marxist discussions along theses lines see Gough (1979), 
Vobruba (1978); for similar liberal accusations see 
Janowitz (1976) and Bacon and Eltis (1976)•
20 Calculated from absolute data presented in OECD (1981). Data 
for the 1950s in most countries exclude 1950 and 1951.
21 The data on economic growth and inflation are taken from 
OECD (1981). The data on deficits stem from various editions 
of the German "Finanzbericht" and, in the case of Finland 
and Ireland, from the German "Statistisches Jahrbuch". Of 
course, the analyses are valid only to the degree that these 
data are comparable. In the absence of original research on 
public finance, the quality of comparative data sets on 
public deficits is to be treated with some reserve.
22 The correlation refers to the growth of the social expenditure 
ratio between 1970 and 1977 on the one hand, and the average
annual economic growth rates in the same period, on the other
23 The procedure consists of a simple mathematical equation which 
may be illustrated most easily if per capita social expenditure 
is expressed as a product of the three components. Reductions 
then yield the following identity: S/P = R/P x B/R x S/B, 
where S stands for social outlays, P for the total population,
R for the population under risk, and B for the beneficiaries
in receipt of social payments. Following the same logic, the 
share of social expenditure in the social product is expressed 
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Table A 1 : The social expenditure ratios of Eastern European coun-
Year BULG CZECH GERM HUNG POL. USSR YUG. Average
1977 16.2 19.0 16.2 15.1 11.8 13.4 15.3
1976 15.5 18.2 15.4 15.2 11.1 13.6 14.8
1975 16.0 17.2 15.3 14.8 11.0 13.8 14.7
1974 16.2 17.5 15.6 13.6 10.7 12.4 14.3
1973 14.6 17.9 16.1 12.2 10.6 12.4 14.0
1972 14.2 17.5 15.3 11.6 10.5 12.7 13.6
1971 14.5 18.1 13.6 11.3 10.4 12.2 12.9 13.4
1970 13.7 18.0 13.2 11.1 10.7 11.9 13.2 13.1
1969 14.7 17.7 13.4 10.6 10.7 12.1 12.4 13.2
1968 13.6 16.7 13.1 10.9 9.9 12.0 12.3 12.7
1967 11.4 16.1 12.8 10.8 9.4 11.6 12.1 12.0
1966 10.0 17.0 11.2 9.4 11.1 12.3 (11.7)
1965 10.0 18.0 10.9 9.3 10.9 11.9 (11.8)
1964 10.1 18.2 9.8 9.3 10.0 10.7 (11.5)
1963 11.0 17.8 9.6 9.4 10.2 11.3 (11.6)
1962 11.2 16.7 9.3 9.5 10.0 12.2 (11.3)
1961 10.7 15.9 8.8 9.1 10.4 12.1 (11.0)
1960 15.3 9.0 10.2 11.0 (11.5)
1959 15.3 9.3 10.6
1958 15.5 8.5 10.2 10.8 (11.4)
1957 14.6 7.7 9.4
1956 15.1




Social expenditure as percentage of net material product.
I ) Average excluding Yugoslavia.
1)
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Table A 3 : The composition of cabinets in Western Europe 1949-1977
Country CENTRE--RIGHT CENTRE-LEFT LEFT-CENTRE
Single Coalition coalitions Coalition Single
.ALJ '66-69 '49-65 '70-77





















IT '53 '51-52 '54-56 '64-69
'57-58 '75 '62-63 '70-71
'76-77 '72-73 '74
NE '59-64 '49-56 '57-58
'67-72 '65-66 '73-77
NO '66-70 '74-77 '49-65
'73 '71-72

































































































Table A 4: Public deficits in Western Europe, 1970-1978
a) Public debt at current prices (in billions of national currencies)
Year AU BE DE FI FR GE TR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
1978 2 8 5 .2 1742 9 7 .6 1 3 .0 3 3 7 .7 3 6 5 .5 5 .2 5 141137 1 1 6 .5 1 0 4 .2 1 7 0 .6 4 6 .8 1 0 0 .6
1977 239-4 1511 7 1 .6 ( 1 1 .8 ) 2 7 0 .4 3 2 5 .2 4 .2 5 105769 1 0 3 .3 8 4 .8 1 3 5 .3 4 7 .8 8 8 .1
1976 1 9 8 .5 1315 5 0 .7 1 0 .5 244 .7 2 9 2 .3 3 .6 6 93573 9 5 .6 6 4 .2 1 1 5 .4 4 6 .7 8 1 .8
1975 1 5 7 .2 1150 3 3 .4 2 1 8 .5 2 5 3 .1 2 .7 9 72870 8 5 .0 5 2 .4 1 0 6 .4 4 1 .0 7 1 .5
1974 1 0 9 .0 1014 2 6 .9 5 .1 1 6 0 .5 1 8 8 .8 2 .0 0 56923 7 5 .7 4 4 .3 9 1 .8 3 5 .7 6 4 .6
1973 9 3 .3 935 2 6 .1 1 4 6 .3 1 6 5 .3 33459 7 0 .5 3 6 .8 7 9 .9 3 1 .1 5 9 .31972 8 3 .8 880 2 5 .8 6 .2 1 4 0 .0 1 5 4 .2 U I
1 .2  
'I “1
26768 6 9 . 3 1 3 3 .1 7 1 .8 2 8 .1 5 4 .2
'1971 7 3 .8 761 2 4 .7 1 3 7 .4 21340 8 4 . 9 1 2 8 .5 6 3 .0 2 7 .2 4 8 .11970 7 2 .8 719 2 1 .9 ( 7 .3 ) 1 3 2 .5 1 2 3 .4 l • I 18273 7 8 .3 2 5 .5 5 7 .2 2 5 .3 4 3 .7
b) Public debt at constant (1975) prices
1978 2 4 9 .9 1449 7 5 .3 9 .7 2 5 7 .5 3 2 8 .1 3 .5 3 88057 9 5 .7 8 3 .4 1 2 5 .3 4 3 .9 6 9 .81977 2 1 9 .6 1310 6 0 .5 ( 9 .5 ) 2 2 5 .8 3 0 3 .5 3 .1 5 75262 8 9 .2 7 2 .8 1 0 9 .1 4 6 .4 6 7 .61976 1 9 0 .6 1223 4 6 .7 9 .3 2 2 2 .7 2 8 3 .1 3 .0 5 79287 8 7 .8 5 9 .7 1 0 3 .3 4 5 .5 7 1 .51975 1 5 7 .2 1150 3 3 .4 2 1 8 .5 2 5 3 .1 2 .7 9 72870 8 5 .0 5 2 .4 1 0 6 .4 4 1 .0 7 1 .51974 1 1 8 .9 1142 3 0 .3 5 .9 1 8 2 .0 2 0 1 .5 2 .4 4 66892 8 4 .2 4 8 .1 1 0 5 .3 3 8 .2 8 1 .91973 1 1 1 .7 1181 3 3 .0 1 8 4 .4 1 8 8 .6 46578 8 5 .7 4 4 .6 9 9 .6 3 5 .6 8 6 .61972 1 0 7 .2 1188 3 5 .8 1 0 .0 1 9 0 .2 1 8 6 .5 41592 9 1 .3 4 3 .8 9 5 .9 3 4 .8 8 4 .71971 1 0 1 .2 1092 3 7 .4 1 75 .4 1 .8 6 35231 1 2 2 .4 3 9 .6 9 0 .2 3 7 .0 8 1 .41970 1 0 5 .4 1088 3 5 .8 ( 1 3 .7 ) 2 0 2 .1 1 6 9 .7 32336 1 2 2 .5 3 7 .8 8 8 .1 3 7 .6 80.8
c) Debt ratios (public debt as % of GDP)
1978 3 4 .1 58.4 31.1. 9 .3 1 5 .8 2 8 .3 8 3 .7 6 3 .5 4 1 .4 4 9 .1 4 1 .7 3 0 .9 6 1 .5
1977 30.3 5 4 .4 2 5 .3 ( 9 .2 ) 1 4 .4 2 7 .1 7 9 .3 5 5 .6 3 9 .5 4 4 .3 3 6 .8 3 2 .8 6 1 .7
1976 2 7 .4 5 1 .1 1 9 .9 9.1 1 4 .6 2 6 .0 8 1 .2 5 9 .7 3 9 .8 3 7 .6 3 4 .0 3 2 .9 6 6 .0
1975 23.9 5 0 .6 1 5 .3 1 5 .0 2 4 .5 7 5 .8 5 8 .1 4 0 .6 3 5 .2 3 5 .6 2 9 .3 7 8 .1
1974 17.8 4 9 .3 1 3 .8 5 .8 1 2 .6 1 9 .1 6 7 .9 5 1 .4 3 9 .8 3 4 .1 3 6 .1 2 5 .3 7 8 .1
1973 17.4 5 3 .3 1 4 .9 1 3 .1 1 8 .0 3 7 .3 4 1 .9 3 2 .9 3 5 .6 2 3 .9 8 1 .5
1972 1 7 .6 5 6 .9 1 7 .0 1 0 .8 1 4 .3 1 8 .7 3 5 .6 4 7 .2 3 3 .6 3 5 .6 2 4 .0 8 5 .8
1971 1 7 .6 5 5 .1 1 8 .8 1 8 .2
6 3 .3
3 1 .1 6 5 .5 3 2 .0 3 4 .1 2 6 .4 8 4 .2
1970 1 9 .4 5 7 .0 1 8 .4  ( 1 6 .3 ) 1 6 .9 1 8 .2 2 9 .1 6 8 .3 3 1 .9 3 3 .7 2 7 .9 8 5 .9
S o u rc e : Bundesm inisterium  d er F in an zen ; S t a t i s t i s c h e s  Bundesamt ( f o r  Ir e la n d  p r io r  to  1974 and fo r  
F in la n d ) ; F in n ish  d ata  f o r  1970 and 1977 a re  p a r t i a l  e s t im a te s .  F ig u re s  a t  c o n sta n t 




























































































Figure A 1: Increase of social expenditure ratio and of public debt, 19701977
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